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Abstract 
In this paper, we investigate the location choice of immigrants at retirement. In a context 
where labour considerations no longer matter, the location decisions are expected to depend 
not only on a comparison of standard-of-living between the origin and host countries, but 
should also be affected by the strength of family relationships. Assuming that migrants derive 
some satisfaction from contact and visits with other family members, we suggest that 
migrants may choose a third type of migration move beyond the standard stay/return decision 
called the ‘va-et-vient’ where individuals choose to share their time across the host and the 
origin country. In the empirical analysis, we test the determinants of the location intention at 
retirement using a recent data set on migrants currently living in France. We found that the 
migrant’s choice is significantly related to the location of other family members and that 
those determinants vary with respect to the different preferred choices. 
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1.  Introduction  
 
The decision of immigrants to return to their home country has attracted much attention over 
the previous decade (see in particular Dustmann, 2001). Until now, the literature has only 
investigated the returns of working age immigrants. This paper brings some new findings on 
the optimal location decision of immigrants at the time of their retirement. In particular, we 
document a previously unknown location “strategy” beyond the traditional stay/return choice. 
We observe that around a quarter of immigrants in our comprehensive data set are willing 
neither to return home, nor to stay in the host country, but they intend to spend a fraction of 
the year in each country. The data set being collected in France, we call this strategy the “va-
et-vient”. 
Some facts lead us to think that the importance of this alternative strategy may not be 
confined to our data set. Importantly, immigrants living in France who decide to retire can 
claim their full pension benefits in the chosen country of living. In fact, as much as 8% of all 
pension benefits in France are paid to retirees who live abroad (CNAV, 2001). So, the French 
pension system does not appear to provide any incentives to choose to conduct a “va-et-vient” 
rather than to return to the home country or to stay in the host country. Recent evidence 
suggests that immigrants’ decision of location is certainly not restricted to a simple stay 
versus return choice. 
For instance, in Germany, Constant and Zimmermann (2003) find that as much as 
60% of immigrants interviewed in the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP) are multiple 
movers, who at one time during their stay in Germany chose to spend a period in the home 
country and then to come back to the host country
1. Other evidence suggests that a substantial 
proportion of Indian and Taiwanese immigrants in the US tend to commute to their origin 
country for investment purposes (ILO, 2003). Sociologists have documented that a third of a 
sample of Italian and Spanish retired immigrants in Switzerland choose to share their time 
between the host and the origin country (Bolzman et al., 1993). Other evidence in Sweden and 
in the US points to a related pattern observed amongst retirees who can afford to spend part of 
the year in “warmer” regions at the time of retirement (Gustafson, 2001; Hogan and Steinnes, 
1998). 
With the bulk of unskilled immigrants having arrived in the main European host 
countries such as Germany, France and the UK during the 1960s and 70s, we expect those 2 
immigrants to take their retirement soon. The optimal location of retired immigrants could 
pose a challenge to policy makers in both the host and the origin countries if we imagine the 
case of a sudden return of large waves of retired immigrants to their home country. Health 
expenses would be alleviated in the host and increased in the origin country and aggregate 
consumption would increase in the origin and decrease in the host. Little is however known of 
the individual location choice arising for immigrants at retirement, and this paper sets to 
provide a first investigation of such a choice.  
Our paper is related to the analysis of Konrad et al. (2002), where the optimal location 
decision of children is primarily determined by the location of siblings with the view of caring 
for parents. Unlike them, however, we focus on the location decision of parents at the time of 
their retirement. Another main difference with this paper is their focus on a “geography of the 
family” - living in the same country. Our paper is set in the international rather than the 
internal migration framework. We do consider the effect of a taste for living in a different 
country that can determine the location at retirement. Finally, by studying the location of 
immigrants at retirement, our paper implicitly relies on models of lifecycle migration where 
individuals move for a limited duration with the intention of returning to their country of 
origin (Djajic and Milbourne, 1988). 
Dustmann (2003) considers both realised and intended return decisions of immigrants 
in their home country, and introduces the role of young children as a main determinant. He 
finds support for a chronicle where children cause the return decisions of parents, using the 
randomness of the sex of children as an identifying strategy. The empirical results are 
consistent with a model where parents care for the future of their children; those 
considerations being different for sons and daughters. The home country is judged more 
beneficial for daughters, while the host country is preferred for boys. Parents highly favour 
the cultural environment of the origin country for daughters whereas they value more the 
economic prospects offered in the host country for sons. Implicitly, in this framework, parents 
are the only decision makers in the location decision, an assumption implied by the time 
frame investigated (i.e. the working life). For older parents at retirement, however, this 
assumption has to be relaxed. 
Empirically, we investigate the main determinants of the “va-et-vient” choice in 
comparison with the decision to return and to stay. Using a similar identifying strategy as 
Dustmann (2003), we find that the actual location of children, in the host or the origin 
                                                                                                                                                          
1 The use of a panel data set may lead to measurement errors, owing in particular to selective attrition. It is certainly very 3 
country, matters for the return, while the presence of children, whatever their location, is an 
important determinant of the “va-et-vient”. We also investigate the importance of other family 
ties on the respondents’ location at retirement (namely their parents, siblings, and other family 
members), both for the “va-et-vient” and the return. The data shows that the “va-et-vient” is 
more often chosen by immigrants originating from other countries than Northern Europe and 
that the return is more frequent for immigrants originating from Southern Europe and from 
Central and the South of Africa. 
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows: in Section 2, we introduce a 
simple model where individuals maximise their utility through interactions with their 
children, their income and a preference parameter for the host or the origin country. In Section 
3, we describe the data set which focuses on older immigrants living in France and discuss 
further the importance of the “va-et-vient” choice. In Section 4, we first show that the location 
of the family members strongly influences the preferred location at retirement and then 
discuss the potential endogeneity of the actual location of children. Concluding comments are 
in Section 5. 
 
 
2.  Theoretical Background 
 
Numerous papers have considered a return of immigrants to their home country motivated by 
positive income differentials between the home and host countries. Recently, Dustmann 
(2003) has introduced altruism of parents towards their offspring as a further determinant, 
with the focus on families with young children who are most often constrained by the 
decision of their parents. It is however likely that the children will not comply with the 
decisions of their parents when they are adult and live on their own. In the context of 
retirement, we believe that the location decision of children and other family members may 
play a significant role in the migrant’s choice of location.  
As a motivation, let us consider a framework with two persons - one parent referred as 
p and one adult child denoted by k
2. Suppose first that parents make their decision of 
preferred location taking into account the exogenously given decision of their children. It 
could be the case if children have currently a paid job in the host country for instance, so that 
                                                                                                                                                          
difficult to track a migrant who decides to return to the origin country and then to come back in the host country.  4 
they would face loss of income by moving to the home country following the move of their 
parents. Parents are supposed to gain utility from increased interaction with their children, but 
distances between the area of living of parents and children act as the shadow price of those 
interactions (see Konrad et al., 2002). Parents choose their location at retirement yielding the 
highest utility, either the host or the origin country. 
The parent’s level of satisfaction depends on private consumption  pj C , on  kj S the 
number of interactions with the child, and on a preference parameter for the country  j a  
ultimately chosen as residence
3. Those variables are defined with reference to country 
H O j , = ,  O being the origin country and H the host country, where the parents have 
accumulated work experience and savings for their retirement. The utility function is 
) , , ( j j pj j a S C U , with  0 / > ∂ ∂ j j S U
4. The location choice of p depends on the price of 
interactions, which is much higher when the parent and the child choose different countries. 
We denote the price by  d + 1 ,  d  being the distance between the countries. We normalize d  
to 0 when both agents live in the same country, but contact and visits become more expensive 
as distance between residence countries grows (phone calls, plane or train tickets cost more) 
and  0 > d . 
Notional incomes in both countries,  O Y  and  H Y , also differ
5. Assuming that the child 
chooses to reside in the host country H, where he has been raised as a second generation 
immigrant, the budget constraint is  H H pH Y S C = +  if the parent chooses H, and 
O O pO Y S d C = + + ) 1 (  if he chooses to return to the origin country O. The parent seeks to 
maximize the utility function  ) , , ( j j pj j a S C U  with respect to the previous budget constraint. 
The location choice is given by a comparison of the corresponding indirect utility functions, 
denoted by  O V  and  H V , and the parent decides to return home if  ) , ( ) , , ( H H H O O O a Y V a d Y V > . 
Otherwise, he decides to stay in the host country. 
The decision depends then on a comparison of the notional incomes in both countries, 
the price of interactions and the preference parameter for each country. For instance, with a 
                                                                                                                                                          
2 We consider only children in our analysis, but this should be taken as proxy for all persons whose interaction generates 
increased utility to the parents. So, children are used instead of aunts, grandparents, sisters or friends made during younger 
years as long as those individuals are adults and therefore make their own location decision. 
3 We therefore treat children as a consumption good. 
4 The utility function is assumed continuous, twice differentiable and concave with respect to the first two terms. 
5 Two interpretations are possible: if pension flows are identical in both countries, then the different costs of living imply 
different standards of living. But it may also be that real pension payments are not equal, if capital is not perfectly mobile 
between the countries and/or if pension benefits cannot be fully claimed in the home country. 5 
utility function of the form  j j pj j a S C U ln ln ln γ β + + = , with  0 > β  and  0 > γ   a positive 
parameter, we easily deduce the optimal values for private consumption and attention. The 
difference  H O V V −  is equal to  ) / ln( ) 1 ln( ) / ln( ) 1 ( H O H O H O a a d Y Y V V γ β β + + − + = − , and 
the parent chooses to return if  0 > − H O V V
6. The model leads to the following results: first, as 
the parent values interactions, he/she will attach more weight to the income differential. 
Second, the higher price of contact and visits when the distance increases, also lead to a lower 
probability of return (the amount of attention is reduced). So, the location of the child matters 
since it influences the parent’s decision through the price of contact
7. 
As it stands, the previous setting suggests that there is only one choice of location or 
indifference between locations. With several family members, the problem is different. For 
instance, consider the case of two children, so that both children live in H or O, or one 
chooses the origin O and the other one chooses H. In the latter case, there may exist a third 
choice for the parents. By spending some time in both countries, the migrant is in a position to 
influence the price of contact and visits with the rest of the family. Imagine that the migrant 
returns temporarily to the origin country. Then, he will spend some time only with other 
family members currently living in that country; but when coming back to France, he will 
have visits only with family members located in France. We named this strategy the “va-et-
vient”. 
If the parents spend, for example, 6 months in each country, the price of attention with 
respect to each child is now lower. It would be equal to one half when the child lives in H and 
the parent is in the host country, and also equal to one half when the child lives in O and the 
parent is in the origin country. But the parent supports a fixed cost when choosing the “va-et-
vient” (for instance, owing to housing in both countries). If this fixed cost is not too high, the 
parent will choose the “va-et-vient” strategy since it provides more contact with both children. 
One expects the “va-et vient” to be more probable the higher the cost of attention. This can be 
explained by the higher cost of buying plane tickets every time parents want to see their child 
compared to the solution of paying for one return flight per year in the case of “va-et-vient”. 
As costs of transportation are positively related to the distance between the two countries, 
                                                 
6 When β=0, the setting is exactly the one presented in Dustmann (2003). The higher the standard of living in the origin 
country, the higher will be the probability to return. And similarly, the higher the preference for the origin country, the more 
returns will happen. 
7 If the child chooses H, then two counteracting effects are an income-effect inciting the parents to return and a lower price of 
attention in H inciting the parent to stay in the host country. Now, if the child chooses to live in the origin country O, both 
effects act actually in the same direction and provide increased incentives for the parent to return. 6 
more distance between a parent and their children should favour a solution of “va-et-vient” 
(which also depends on the cost of accommodation in both countries). 
The location of children and more generally of every individual whose interactions 
lead to increased utility has a central role as the determinant of the preferred location. This is 
different to the framework analyzed in Dustmann (2003), where children always follow their 
parents. The location of all family members in the same country leads to higher incentives for 
choosing this location. But as children are spread across the host and the origin country, then 
the choice of a “va-et-vient” strategy becomes more probable. In addition, interaction with 
children is a service without any direct substitute (see Ehrlich and Lui, 1991; Laferrère and 
Wolff, 2004). As elderly parents are certainly expecting immaterial transfers and attention 
from their children, it increases the probability of time sharing between the host and the 
source country. Also, one expects that the further away from the nuclear family the 
individuals are, the less these interactions matter
8. 
So far, we have assumed the exogeneity of children’s location choice. A central 
concern here is to know how restrictive this assumption is. At the time of retirement for 
migrants, children are most often adult and have frequently a paid job, either in the origin or 
host country. If we allow for children deciding whether they move closer to their parents (or 
move far away from them) at the time of retirement, the cost of such a move may be 
considerable for the child. They will have to quit their paid activity, and will also suffer from 
the loss of social contacts. 
Konrad et al. (2002) consider a more general model of family location where siblings 
are altruistic towards the parents and both parents and children are allowed to choose where to 
locate, depending on where the parents and siblings are located. In that case, the firstborn 
child’s location decision should influence the location choice of latter born children. Locating 
further away from the parents allows to shift part of the burden of providing parental care. 
The “va-et-vient” choice is not a strategy in this model, which is more appropriate to explain 
a “geography of the family” rather than the location of immigrants at retirement. It may still 
be the case that in migrants’ families, children (and other family members) make independent 
location choices. Younger children entering their adult life may for instance decide to live in 
the same country as the one chosen by their parents.  
                                                 
8 This hierarchy may be explained by the evolutionary theory of sympathy between relatives (see Bergstrom, 1996). 
Following the theory of kin selection given by Hamilton’s rule, one can define a coefficient of relationship between kin such 
that children and parents matter the most, then siblings, then grand-parents, uncles, aunts, less close friends and acquaintance 
having ultimately the lower weight.  7 
Then, first order conditions would suggest a simultaneous equations model, where the 
children variable in the parental choice equation is endogenous. But if location decisions of 
family members are all simultaneously taken, it becomes less clear to understand the rationale 
for a “va-et-vient” strategy. We will discuss the problem of endogeneity of the other family 
members more closely when presenting the empirical results. 
 
 
3.  Description of the Data 
 
In this paper, we use a single cross-sectional data set in which the range of questions goes far 
beyond any traditional survey used until now for studying returning immigrants. The PRI 
(Passage à la Retraite des Immigrés) survey has been collected by the ‘Caisse Nationale 
d’Assurance Vieillesse’ from December 2002 to March 2003 in France, in collaboration with 
the ‘Institut National de la Statistique et des Etudes Economiques’. The sample consists of 
individuals aged between 45 and 75, who were born abroad or of foreign nationality, but live 
in France at the date of the survey. Each respondent has been asked a wide range of questions 
related to his individual migration moves. Also, a detailed picture of the family members 
including parents, siblings and children is gathered together with the migration history, their 
position with respect to either paid activity or retirement, health, intergenerational transfers, 
income, wealth and housing, and many other indicators of social assimilation. 
The sample, which is representative of the migrant population currently living in 
France, is composed of 6211 individuals, for which 51% originate from Europe and 38% from 
Africa. Nationalities are rather concentrated as six countries account for 70% of the total. 
These are, in decreasing order of their size: Portugal, Italy, Spain, Algeria, Morocco and 
Tunisia. More women originate from the first three countries (56%) than from the three 
remaining (33%). Males are older than women (34% over 60 years old compared to 29%). 
Recent predominantly female migration in France has tended to equalise the previous male 
dominated gender imbalances. Finally, average number of years since migration is 33, with an 
average age at migration of 24. 
In order to better understand the location choices of migrants after retirement, one 
would ideally need a panel data set that follows individuals over the years and across the 
different locations. The cost of finding individuals after they move in another country is most 8 
probably prohibitive and therefore researchers often rely on intentions
9. We proceed in the 
same way in this paper. Although this strategy is necessary considering the cross-sectional 
property of our data set, it is clear that it is subjected to potential bias due to subsequent 
changes of intentions. This potential bias has been extensively considered in Dustmann 
(2003), who showed that 86% of those who returned in the GSOEP between 1985 and 1997 
had indicated their intention to return in 1984. Also, Gordon and Mohlo (1995) using the 
General Household Survey found that 80% of individuals who expressed an intention to move 
had actually migrated within the following 5 years
10. 
The exact wording of the return intention question is: “at the time of your retirement, 
would you like to: stay in France – return to the origin country – perform the ‘va-et-vient’ 
between France and the origin country – do not know yet?”. Two comments can be made 
here. First, we restrict our analysis to respondents who are not retired at the time of the 
survey, which reduces our sample to 4336 observations. Second, since individuals are all over 
45 year old, we can expect them to have a rather clear idea of their location decision when 
they retire. It seems important to note that the labour market status is particularly important 
for migrants. Returning to the origin country, while still in employment, may be very costly 
because of the loss of current income. The benefits of the initial migration move are certainly 
lower when retired. So, higher mobility can be expected at the time of retirement. However, 
until now, most of the literature on return migration has focused on returns during activity for 
individuals. 
In Table 1, we give the percentage for the different answers given to the preferred 
choice at retirement. Relatively few immigrants who live in France at the date of the survey 
state that they will return to their home country (7%), whereas a large proportion intends to 
stay in the host country (58%). But the most striking figure is the very high proportion of 
those who state they will spend a fraction of the year in the host and in the home country. The 
frequency of the ‘va-et-vient’ strategy is around 24%. 
A central area of concern is to determine whether the importance of this ‘va-et-vient’ 
strategy is confined to our data, for instance owing to some strange features of the French 
pensions system that makes it particularly attractive. As described on websites linked to the 
French government, no restrictions are imposed on the payment made abroad for pensions 
                                                 
9 The GSOEP has been used for studying returns using the attrition property of the data set where a “moved abroad” is 
indicated (Dustmann, 2003; Constant and Zimmermann, 2003). Burda et al (1998) have also used the GSOEP to investigate 
moving intentions of East Germans to West Germany. 
10  See Manski (2003) for a demonstration of the importance of using intentions in economics. 9 
accumulated in France
11. In fact, as much as 8% of all pension payments are made to residents 
abroad (CNAV, 2001). This suggests that the “va-et-vient” does not appear to be resulting 
from particularity of the French pensions system. The “va-et-vient” has already been 
documented by other areas of specialisation. Sociologists observed a similar proportion of 
“va-et-vient” for retired Italians and Spanish immigrants in Switzerland (Bolzman et al., 
1993). Gerontologists have studied the question of “seasonal” migration for retired 
immigrants (Hogan and Steinnes, 1992, 1998; McHugh, 1990), where retired individuals 
spend part of the year in southern sunnier states of the US. Although the economic literature 
has until now largely ignored this case, it seems that the “va-et-vient” decision does indeed 
constitute an extra strategy for retired immigrants. 
We have two other sources in the data set that confirm the importance of the “va-et-
vient” choice at retirement. First, the intention of the partner (if any) is asked of the 
respondent. Not surprisingly, intentions are highly correlated, the corresponding proportions 
being equal to 21.1% for the “va-et-vient” and 61% for the stay in the host country. Since 
both partners are expected to live in the same country during retirement, both decisions are 
highly interdependent. Also of interest is the fact that respondents are asked about the current 
choice of their friends and social network (“nationals”, see Table 1). The choice of “va-et-
vient” appears even higher for those: around 30% among individuals from the same origin 
country as the respondent, whereas the choice to stay in France is slightly lower (around 
40%). 
After having shown the importance of this extra-strategy, we now seek to better 
understand its main motivation. We give the reasons chosen by respondents for their location 
in Table 2. Regarding the decision to stay in France, the main motivation is the presence of 
children and family. The second most important reason is that the respondent feels better in 
the host country, which is very vague and a not very informative indication. The main reasons 
for a return at retirement are the willingness to join the family (76%), the ownership of a 
residence (59%) and the lower cost of living (58%)
12. We may expect the first two motives to 
be highly correlated. For the “va-et-vient” intention, the main motivations are all linked to the 
family. In particular, 54% say that they want to come back often to see their children and 23% 
say that they have family in both countries. So, accounting for the different motives reported 
                                                 
11 A simple search on google with the key words: “retraite a l’etranger” leads to official webpages indicating the apparent 
easy steps to claim pensions benefits in case of a move abroad (see for instance the following link: 
http://www.expat.org/retraite/retraite_etranger.htm ). 
12 Respondents were asked to say yes or no to each answer, which explains why percentages do not add up to 100%. 10 
by the migrants suggests that the main reasons for the location at retirement deal with family 
considerations. 
Location intentions by origin countries are in Table 3. A comparison by continents 
shows that Europeans and Asians tend to mostly favour the stay in the host country, while 
Africans and Middle Easterners choose more often the “va-et-vient”. But breaking down the 
continents further introduces large discrepancies: North Europeans tend largely to prefer to 
stay in France, and the same applies to Eastern Europeans. The “va-et-vient” is a much more 
popular option amongst the Portuguese (41%), whose intentions dominate by far all other 
single countries considered. Many Tunisians currently living in France also intend to perform 
a “va-et-vient” between their origin country and France (40%). Finally, the intention to return 
is comparatively more important for Central and Southern Africans, the Portuguese and the 
Americans. 
In Table 4, we present the characteristics of the sample according to the three locations 
choice given by the respondents. For the purpose of our analysis, we choose only the 
individuals who have reported a location decision (stay in France, return, or “va-et-vient”), 
which left us with a sample of 3915 observations. Females on average tend to desire more 
often to stay in the host country, the same applies for older individuals. The “va-et-vient” 
appears to be more popular amongst men and younger individuals. More years of education 
does increase the decision to stay in France. Intentions to stay in the host country are more 
likely with many years since migration, whereas the more recent immigrants favour a return. 
The “va-et-vient” appears to be the preferred choice for immigrants with intermediate years 
since migration (from 20 to 39 years). Finally, levels of income (measured at the household 
level) do not seem to be associated with any clear-cut location intention
13. 
We finally consider the locations of the other family members. Information is not 
identical for all family members. We know the current country of residence of parents and 
siblings of interviewees. For other family members (grandparents, uncles, aunts, etc), the 
interviewees communicate whether some of them are living in the origin country, without any 
further details on their position within the extended family. Characteristics of children of 
interviewees are well described. For each of them, the survey provides their age, their country 
of birth, and their current country of living. Generally, no information is provided on the 
intended location of family members at the time of retirement for interviewees. 
                                                 
13 In the PRI survey, there is no information concerning the migrant’s level of personal income. This is certainly not 
problematic in the context of our problem, since the migration decision at retirement is likely to be a joint decision from both 
spouses as shown by the descriptive statistics reported in Table 1. 11 
More than 8 over 10 respondents with parents in France intend to stay at retirement. 
Conversely, only 58% of respondents who have parents living in the origin country intend to 
stay in France. Only a few immigrants have no children in France (10.5%), and a similar 
proportion have children in the home country (13.5%). Clearly, the location of children 
appears to make a difference. When the respondent has children in France, the preferred 
location choice at retirement is the host country for 66.1% of migrants, but this proportion 
equals only 52.7% when there are some children in the origin country. In the latter case, we 
observe a significant increase in the probability of returning to the origin country, respectively 
17.1% instead of 7.2%, and the frequency of “va-et-vient” is also slightly higher. 
These descriptive results suggest that family location certainly matters when 
explaining migrants’ location at retirement, but results in Table 4 also show that 
characteristics differ widely whether the interviewees intend to stay in France, to return to the 
origin country or to perform a “va-et-vient” across both countries. Thus, we turn to a 
multivariate analysis to better understand whether the location of other family members is 
really helpful to explain the migrant’s intention. 
 
 
4. Econometric  Analysis 
 
4.1. Empirical  strategy 
 
According to the data, each migrant faces three location decisions: he may either stay in the 
host country ( 1 = j ), return to the origin country ( 2 = j ) or spend some time in both the 
origin and host countries ( 3 = j ). For these random alternatives, we denote the corresponding 
utilities by  j j j X U ε β + = , with  X  a set of individual explanatory variables,  j β  the 
associate vector of coefficients for each alternative  j  (3 , 2 , 1 = j ), and  j ε  a random 
perturbation. The probability for a migrant to choose outcome  j  is 
() ) , Pr( Pr l j k j U U U U j > > = , with  j l k ≠ , . 
Under the assumption that the stochastic utilities are independently and identically 
distributed with extreme value distribution, the corresponding model is the classic 
multinomial Logit model. The probability of occurrence for the alternative  j  12 
is  () ∑ = =
3
1 / ; Pr
i
X X i j e e X j
β β β . Since choice depends only on utility differences, 
identification is achieved by normalizing the utility of an alternative to zero. We will always 
define the intention to stay in France as the base category. Estimation of the MNL model is 
straightforward, but a central problem is its underlying assumption of the independence of 
irrelevant alternatives, such that the odds for any pair of outcomes are determined without 
reference to the other outcomes that might be available.  
In our analysis, we test the IIA assumption using a Hausman-type test proposed by 
Hausman and McFadden (1984). The test involves three subsequent steps. First, we estimate 
the full model with all outcomes included, the resulting vector of estimated coefficients is 
F β ˆ . Second, we estimate a restricted model by eliminating one outcome category and obtain 
the estimates  R β ˆ . If  FF β ˆ  is the subset of  F β ˆ  after eliminating coefficients not estimated in 
the restricted model, the Hausman test of IIA is 
) ˆ ˆ ( )] ˆ ( ˆ ) ˆ ( ˆ [ )' ˆ ˆ (
1
FF R FF R FF R IIA V V H β β β β β β − − − =
− . The statistic  IIA H  is asymptotically 
distributed as chi square, degrees of freedom being equal to the number of raws in  R β ˆ  under 
the null hypothesis (i.e if IIA holds true). As  ) ˆ ( ˆ ) ˆ ( ˆ
FF R V V β β −  is not necessarily positive 
semi-definite,  IIA H  can be negative
14. 
 
4.2.  Results assuming exogenous location of family members 
 
Let us now discuss the econometric results. For the estimation, we begin by estimating the 
MNL model where we only introduce the characteristics of the migrants, including their 
origin country. We include as covariates in the regression: gender, age, presence of a spouse, 
age at migration, years of education and a measure of the household’s income. We 
subsequently discuss the effect of the additional family variables dealing with the location of 
parents, children, siblings and more distant relatives. We report the corresponding estimates 
in Table 5, the base category being the decision to stay in France. To make the interpretation 
of estimates easier, we present the marginal effects and their standard errors. 
  We first consider the decision to return to the origin country (keeping in mind that 
staying in France is the reference). This choice is significantly decreased for women, and 13 
living as a couple is not relevant for the optimal choice. Years of education exert a negative 
impact, one additional year leading to a decrease of 2.2% in the return probability. Income 
measured at the household level does not influence the return decision. The location choice is 
strongly influenced by the migrant’s trajectory, since duration of migration significantly 
reduces the return decision. Staying in France one additional year reduces by 3.5% the 
probability of returning to the origin country. As the migrant’s age is also the sum of age at 
entry and duration of migration, this means that a migrant who has come to France early in his 
life cycle has a strong preference for staying in France at retirement. All of these findings are 
not surprising
15. 
In order to control for country heterogeneity, we also introduce in the regression a set 
of dummy variables corresponding to the different regions of origin. With respect to countries 
of Northern Europe, the probability to return is significantly increased for persons originating 
from the countries of Southern Europe and Central and Southern Africa. In the former case, 
the return probability increases by 8.6% and by 16.8% in the latter. It is also slightly more 
important for persons who come from America, but the marginal effect is just below 
conventional thresholds for statistical significance. 
  Turning to the “va-et-vient” strategy, we first observe that several characteristics have 
a similar impact on the “va-et-vient” and the return decision. The probability of “va-et-vient” 
is less important for women, higher-educated persons; and both age and migration duration 
exert a negative impact on this location choice. For instance, one additional year in France 
reduces the “va-et-vient” probability by 7.4 per cent. As opposed to the return category, we 
now observe that household’s income has a positive effect on the “va-et-vient” decision (at 
the 5% level). A simple explanation is that increased housing and travel costs are associated 
to the “va-et-vient” strategy, so that poorer or liquidity constrained households are less likely 
to share their time between two different countries. 
As for the country effects, we observe that the “va-et-vient” is significantly less 
frequent for migrants emanating from Northern Europe (which is the reference left-out 
category). To quote a few figures, the probability is increased by 25.4% for those coming 
from Southern Europe, by 22.5% for Northern Africa, and by 22.7% from Middle East. This 
                                                                                                                                                          
14 On this point, see the further discussion in Hausman and McFadden (1984). In our context, several Hausman tests of the 
IIA are possible. After having chosen a base category, two tests can be conducted by excluding each of the remaining 
categories to form the restricted model. Another test can be computed by changing the base category. 
15 To further investigate this result that better assimilated migrants are less likely to return, we have also estimated models 
with dummy variables for respondents holding the French citizenship and owning a home in the home country. Although 
both covariates are most probably endogenous to the location decision, they are negatively and significantly associated with 
the return probability at retirement.  14 
result may be due to the fact that the longer the distance separating the origin country and 
France, the higher the probability of choosing the “va-et-vient”. Other unmeasured cultural 
aspects, however, may also explain location intentions at retirement since migrants from 
Southern Europe are the most likely to rely on a “va-et-vient” strategy. 
Two additional comments are in order concerning these MNL estimates. First, when 
testing the relevance of the IIA assumption, we obtain a negative test statistics (see Table 5). 
As pointed out in Hausman and McFadden (1984, p.1226), it is evidence that the IIA 
assumption has not been violated. Second, when comparing estimates respectively for the 
return and for the “va-et-vient” decisions, we have shown that many characteristics were 
acting in the same direction. So, it seems worthwhile to know whether the “va-et-vient” 
choice is really a different one from the return strategy. We perform a simple Wald test for 
linear hypothesis and investigate whether the coefficients of the covariates are identical for 
both the return and “va-et-vient” decisions. The null assumption is clearly rejected, and we 
take this as further evidence that the “va-et-vient” strategy is a different choice deserving 
more investigation
16. 
We then reestimate the MNL model introducing additional variables describing the 
location of other family members (see Table 5). In general, the effects of covariates remain 
unaltered, although there are some slight differences. The coefficient for years since migration 
is still significant, but its size is reduced by a factor of 2. This is an interesting result as this 
coefficient approximates better the ‘true’ assimilation in the host country as family variables 
are now controlled for. As suggested in our theoretical framework, family variables are highly 
relevant to explain both return and “va-et-vient” intentions.  
We note that the different variables dealing with family locations are all significant for 
the return decision (except for the presence of parents in France). This choice is particularly 
associated with the location of siblings, other family in the origin countries and children. The 
probability to return to the origin country is a decreasing function of those family members 
who are currently living in France. Conversely, the intent to return at retirement is more often 
quoted when the migrant has parents, siblings, other family members and children in the 
origin country. 
  Results are slightly different for the “va-et-vient” decision, although the data clearly 
indicates that these family location variables are still jointly significant. Having parents in 
France strongly reduces this location choice at retirement, while the impact of siblings in 
                                                 
16 The corresponding statistic is equal to 61.8 with 13 degrees of freedom, and thus highly significant. 15 
France is now less significant (compared to the return decision) and having children living in 
France does not influence the migrant’s intent. The data indicates an insignificant effect when 
parents live in the home country, while having siblings, other family members and especially 
children in the origin country strongly increases the probability for the migrant to choose the 
‘va-et-vient’. 
Generally, those results confirm the idea put forward by Dustmann (2003) of 
explaining return migration by family variables. Nevertheless, this author was not able to 
distinguish the children according to their current location in the home or the origin country. 
The use of our more comprehensive data allows us to empirically demonstrate that the present 
location of not only children, but also other family members is necessary to understand 
location’s decision of retirees. Now, the question arises of whether we can give a causal 
interpretation to those family variables on the optimal location of the respondents at 
retirement. 
 
4.3.  Family location as an endogenous process 
 
Until now, we assumed that respondents take their retirement decisions conditional on the 
location of other family members. Here, exogeneity depends on the assumptions that location 
choice of other family members including children is exogenous. It is however likely that 
decisions within the household are taken simultaneously, where other family members may 
move where parents would like to spend time. For instance, children may have a higher 
propensity to return home if parents express a wish that they would like to retire in their home 
country. In that case, the estimates of the effects of location of children on parental intentions 
are subject to reverse causality. Let us further investigate this problem. 
We should first emphasise that the severity of this endogeneity problem most probably 
differs across the family ties considered in the analysis. In particular, consider first the ties 
between respondents and their siblings. Keeping in mind that our sample is composed of older 
individuals (of at least 45), siblings can be expected to have their own children, parents-in-law 
and other friends and ties. It appears rather improbable that siblings may move following the 
location decision of respondents at retirement. Also assuming that siblings do not retire at the 
same time, the costs of multiple moves caused by the location of siblings appears to be much 
too high. Similar reasoning applies to other family members such as aunts and uncles. The 
parents of respondents can be expected to be rather old when the respondents retire. It seems 
rather improbable that they may decide to follow their children in their location decision when 16 
aged of 80 or more. The resulting costs (financial and health related) of a move for them are 
again certainly much too high at this later stage of life to be recovered by subsequent benefits. 
We believe that this is mostly in the case of the respondent-children relationship that 
the question of endogeneity arises. On the one hand, young children may be forced to join 
their parents who decided to return (in a tied move). On the other hand, children may decide 
to move where their parents intend to spend their retirement for caregiving purposes. If that is 
the case, then the estimated coefficients previously presented can not be interpreted as causal. 
Here, we would like to point out that this problem is much more relevant for the return than 
for the “va-et-vient”. This latter choice is, in most cases, not feasible for active children. Very 
few jobs offer sufficient flexibility to allow the worker to split the residence across two 
different countries during the year. 
One way of testing for the presence of simultaneity in the location decisions is to 
investigate the association between the location decision of respondents and the effect of their 
daughters and sons. Interestingly, although fertility decisions may be taken simultaneously 
with return decisions, the gender of the child is always exogenous (see the further discussion 
in Dustmann, 2003). In a regression of the intended location at retirement of individuals on 
their children differentiated by sex, a simultaneous location decision would necessarily imply 
the coefficients for girls and boys to be identical. Evidence of different coefficients is 
compatible with a story where children cause parental location decision. Assuming further 
that parents consider the origin country environment as more beneficial for daughters than for 
sons, we can expect the coefficients for girls to be positive, implying more returns for parents. 
The difference in the effects should be more important in very traditional communities. 
Our results are presented in Table 6. A first comment of interest is that children 
coefficients are generally not significant for the return in the home country in models where 
we do not introduce the location of children (models 1 to 3). Conversely, they are significant 
when introducing child location (model 4). For the “va-et-vient”, the opposite result is 
observed. This result confirms our theoretical approach where individuals tend to reduce the 
cost of separation from the family by adopting such a strategy. Spending part of the year in 
each country makes it possible to maintain contacts with children wherever they live (in the 
host or the origin country). 17 
We note that young children tend be associated negatively with the propensity to 
realise the “va-et-vient”, with a 1.39% decrease for each additional child (model 1)
17. Adding 
in model 2 the number of daughters implies that the coefficient for children measures now the 
effect of sons only. We observe significantly different estimates for sons and daughters: each 
boy decrease the probability to conduct a “va-et-vient” by 3.9%, whereas each girl increases it 
by 1.26% (the difference between the coefficient of children and girls). This is incompatible 
with a simultaneous decision on fertility and location decision at retirement, and suggests that 
the coefficients can be taken as causing the decision to conduct a “va-et-vient”
18. When 
looking at the effect of children whatever their age, only the number of daughters increases 
the probability of a “va-et-vient”. 
For the return versus the stay in the host country, we find few effects of children when 
their location is not differentiated. When we introduce those living in the host and the home 
country, we find that each additional boy living in France decreases the probability of return 
by 0.74% whereas each boy living in the origin country increases it by 2.74% (model 4, Table 
6). Importantly, the difference between the coefficients of sons and daughters living in the 
origin country is significant at all conventional levels. This is again support for a story where 
children cause the return of parents. 
All those results are observed given the present location of children. In order to further 
investigate the potential endogeneity of the child location in the intended location of parents, 
we have attempted to estimate a simultaneous model where the determinants of the current 
location of the children are estimated jointly with the intended location of the respondents at 
retirement (Table 7). As the location of children may differ in the same family, we construct a 
new sample where each child is counted as an observation. We end up with a new sample of 
11349 children, corresponding to 3659 parents. For each observation, we have then some 
information on both the parent and child’s characteristics. 
We first estimate a multinomial Logit model to explain the parent’s choice of 
preferred location at retirement and introduce a dummy variable when the child lives in the 
origin country. So, the child’s location is exogenous in the regression (model 1, Table 7). We 
correct the standard-errors for potential correlation of the parental choice across children in 
                                                 
17 We obtain similar results when we control for the other family variables introduced in Table 5. We chose to exclude them 
as there may be potentially endogenous in the location decision of parents. 
18 We have also estimated the previous model with individuals from Southern Europe and North Africa only. When focusing 
on immigrants coming from more traditional countries, the probability to do a “va-et-vient” is decreased by 6% for each 
additional boy while no effect of daughters is detected. 18 
the same family using the Hubert-White method (White, 1980)
 19. We find similar results to 
those described in Table 5. That the child lives in the origin country is associated with an 
increase propensity to return and to realise a “va-et-vient”. Then, we relax the exogeneity 
assumption and estimate the same model with an instrumented child’s location. 
Let us briefly describe the underlying econometric model. First, there is an equation 
for the parent’s preferred location at retirement  j  given by  jk k j k j jk L X U ε δ β + + = , where 
k  as subscript stands for the child,  k L  is the current location of the child (it is equal to 1 
when the child is located in the origin country, and to 0 otherwise); and  jk ε  is a random 
perturbation. The  jk ε  are extreme value distributed. Second, there is an equation for the 
child’s location, which is given by  k k k Z L µ α + =
* , 
*
k L  being the latent value associated to  k L . 
The  k µ  is a random perturbation normally distributed. The parameter of interest for our 
analysis is  j δ . 
Both equations define a simultaneous recursive model with one Probit equation for the 
child’s location and a MNL Logit for the parent’s preferred location with the endogenous 
child’s location as an additional explanatory variable. For the estimation, we add to the MNL 
model an unobserved heterogeneity term (specific to each observation), and we suppose that 
this perturbation and the residual of the Probit equation follow a bivariate normal distribution 
with unitary variances and a correlation coefficient taking a value in the range –1 to 1. We 
estimate jointly the Probit and the multimomial Logit equations using a maximum likelihood 
method. Residuals are integrated out numerically, since no closed form solution to the 
likelihood exists (see the further discussion in Lillard and Panis, 2003)
20. 
According to the results of the joint estimation (model 2, Table 7), the location of each 
child is explain by gender, age and birthplace of the child. We expect the birthplace to exert a 
significant influence on the future location of the child. Children born in France hold the 
French nationality, whereas those born abroad would face more difficulties to obtain it. Girls 
are also expected to be located preferably in the origin country if the cultural environment is 
judged more beneficial for them. Younger children are also more likely to be located in the 
                                                 
19 It is not possible to control for unobserved heterogeneity by introducing fixed effects in the regression since the choice of a 
parent is identical across all children of the same family. 
20 We specify 20 points of integration per dimension for the bivariate distribution, so that there are 400 points of support. The 
program is written in aML and available upon request to the authors. Our results are very close to those obtained with a 
standard instrumental variable approach, where the predicted probability for the child to live in the origin country is 
introduced into the MNL Logit equation for the parental preferred location. 19 
same country as their parents at the time of interview, as they are not financially independent. 
Conversely, older child may make their own decision to move back to the country of origin. 
Simultaneous results in Table 7 indicate first that the probability for a child to live in 
the origin country is greater for female and older children, and it is much higher when the 
child is born in the origin country. Also, we find that the coefficient for the child location in 
the origin country is still significant for the return versus the stay in the host country. 
Correcting for the endogeneity of the child location implies however a decrease by half of this 
coefficient. It is no more significant for the “va-et-vient” versus the stay in the host country. 
This is further support for a story where the child’s location is less relevant for the “va-et-
vient”, as parents may spend part of the year in each country and still be able to minimise the 
cost of separation. 
 
 
5.  Concluding Comments 
 
In this paper, we investigate a new migration strategy for immigrants at the time of their 
retirement, which is to spend a fraction of the year in the host and the rest in the origin 
country. We explain why this strategy is unlikely to be confined to our data set and argue that 
it may be chosen by the increasing proportion of workers who reach retirement while having 
migrated earlier during their working life. We show that the main determinants of this “va-et-
vient” for French migrants differ significantly with respect to the choice of making a definite 
return to the origin country. Most notably, immigrants from Southern Europe, Northern 
Africa and the Middle East are more likely to choose this strategy. This is also the case for 
richer households, lower educated individuals and those who migrated more recently in the 
host country. 
When investigating the effect of family ties, we discuss their potential endogenous 
location with respect to the choice of respondents. We argue that this endogeneity is more 
likely to arise for children, and is less likely to bias our estimates for more distant relatives. 
When investigating the effect of children, we use an identifying strategy related to Dustmann 
(2003) that relies on the randomness of the sex composition of siblings. We find that children 
cause location choice of respondents at retirement. An interpretation for this outcome is that 
respondents reduce the cost of separation from their children and family ties by choosing to 
perform a “va-et-vient” between the host and the origin country at retirement.  20 
This is a new result with respect to the previous migration literature, which has 
important policy applications with respect to housing markets, economic growth, remittances, 
or social assimilation. Along with additional evidence on the magnitude of this phenomenon, 
a better understanding of the consequences of the “va-et-vient” strategy by migrants is 
needed, and we leave these issues for future research. 21 
Table 1 
Preferred location at retirement (%) 
Respondent France  59.1 
        Return to origin country  7.2 
        ‘Va et vient’  24.0 
(N=4336) Don’t  know  yet  9.7 
Partner 
(1) France  61.3 
        Return to origin country  8.5 
        ‘Va et vient’  21.1 
(N=3647)      Don’t know yet  9.1 
Nationals 
(2)   France  39.4 
    Return to origin country  10.5 
  “Va  et  vient”  29.2 
    Don’t know anybody with  same nationality 12.7 
    Differs with generation  4.0 
    Differs between ethnic groups  1.2 
(N=4336) Don’t  know  3.0 
Source: Survey PRI 2003 
(1) Only asked to respondents with a partner. 
(2) Respondents are asked about regular choices for individuals from 
the same origin country as the respondent. 22 
Table 2 
Motives for the preferred location (in %) 
Remain in France 
(1)   
Has children or family members in France  76.2 
To benefit from healthcare  7.8 
No freedom in origin country  3.7 
Has no more connections at home  11.1 
Difficulty to settle back into origin country  11.5 
Consider himself a foreigner at home  9.9 
Partner desires to remain in France  12.8 
Is happy in France  45.2 
Other 6.0 
Return in origin country 
(2)   
To reunite with  family  75.8 
Life is cheaper  57.7 
Owns a house or business there  59.4 
Doesn’t feel well in France  10.3 
Better climate there  5.2 
Love for home country  12.3 
Other 14.2 
“Va-et-vient” 
(1)   
To keep in touch with children in France  58.1 
Has got family in both the origin and home 
country 
52.8 
Love both countries  45.8 
For French social security  13.8 
Owns a house or business in both countries  20.4 
To benefit from a better climate  16.9 
Other 4.8 
Source: Survey PRI 2003 
(1) Total adds to more than 100% as several reasons may 
be chosen. 
(2) Respondent answers “yes” or “no” to each motive. 23 
Table 3 
Preferred location by origin country 
Preferred location  Origin country 
France Origin  country  “Va-et-vient” 
Europe  67.2 7.9 24.9 
  Northern  Europe  84.9 3.7 11.4 
  Southern  Europe  62.9 9.1 28.0 
  Italy  86.9  4.5  8.6 
  Portugal  46.8  12.0  41.2 
    Spain  73.5 7.9 18.6 
  Eastern  Europe  77.5 3.1 19.4 
Africa  62.9 7.8 29.3 
  Northern  Africa  66.1 4.8 29.1 
    Morocco 67.9 5.8 26.4 
    Algeria  70.0 3.0 27.0 
    Tunisia  53.7 6.6 39.7 
 Central  and  Southern 
Africa 
49.3 20.7 30.0 
America 60.9  12.0  27.2 
Middle-East  62.2 6.7 31.1 
Asia  72.4 8.6 19.0 
Total  (%)  65.5 7.9 26.6 
Source: Survey PRI 2003 24 
Table 4 
Descriptive statistics 









Sex     Male  62.0  8.4  29.6  57.0 
   Female  70.1  7.2  22.7  43.0 
Age      Less  than  50 62.9 8.5 28.6  29.7 
   50  –  54  62.9  9.0  28.1  31.3 
   55  plus  69.6  6.6  23.8  39.0 
Has  a  partner    No  69.8 8.3 21.9  15.0 
   Yes  64.7  7.9  27.4  85.0 
Years of schooling  5 less  59.2  9.0  31.9  45.3 
   6  –  11  72.4  7.0  20.7  29.4 
   12  plus  68.8  7.2  24.0  25.3 
Years  since  migration  0  –  19  64.6 13.7 21.7 11.5 
   20  –  29  59.5  8.6  31.9  23.4 
   30  –  39  61.0  8.4  30.6  38.3 
   40  plus  87.0  2.4  10.6  18.3 
Household  income  Quartile  1  68,1 8,6 23,4  25,0 
   Quartile  2  66,1  8,0  25,9  25,0 
   Quartile  3  60,3  9,0  30,7  25,0 
   Quartile  4  67,5  6,2  26,4  25,0 
Parents  in  France    No  62.1 8.6 29.3  83.6 
   Yes  82.9  4.3  12.7  16.4 
Parents in origin country  No  70.2  6.6  23.2  61.4 
      Yes  58.0 10.0 32.0 38.6 
Siblings in France     No  62.5  9.2  28.2  51.5 
   Yes  68.6  6.5  24.9  48.5 
Siblings in origin country  No  76.5  5.0  18.5  31.9 
   Yes  60.3  9.3  30.4  68.1 
Children  in  France  No  60.3 13.9 25.8 10.5 
   Yes  66.1  7.2  26.7  89.5 
Children in origin country No  67.5  6.5  26.0  86.5 
      Yes  52.7 17.2 30.1 13.5 
          Source: Survey PRI 2003 
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Table 5 
MNL models of the location decision 
Variables Return  Va-et-vient Return Va-et-vient 
  Marg. e. s.e.  Marg. e. s.e.  Marg. e. s.e.  Marg. e. s.e. 







e-2) 0.017  0.074  -0.290
** 0.147 -0.146
* 0.081  -0.775
*** 0.170 






Live  in  couple  -0.006 0.011 0.023 0.021 0.000 0.010 0.018 0.022 






Household’s income (10e-5)  -0.011  0.019  0.061
** 0.026 -0.011 0.018 0.061
** 0.026 
Origin country (reference = Northern Europe)          





East Europe  -0.010  0.030  0.155
** 0.068 -0.002 0.032 0.162
** 0.068 
North Africa  0.011  0.024  0.225
***  0.048 0.021 0.024  0.222
*** 0.048 





America 0.094  0.061  0.202
*** 0.078  0.109
* 0.065  0.201
*** 0.079 
Middle East  0.018  0.035  0.227
***  0.064 0.032 0.038  0.225
*** 0.065 
Asia  0.050 0.041 0.077 0.058 0.088
* 0.051 0.112
* 0.062 
Family location          
Parents in France          -0.004  0.014  -0.140
*** 0.021 
Parents in home country          0.013
* 0.008 0.012 0.016 
Siblings in France          -0.017
** 0.008 -0.025
* 0.015 
Siblings in home country          0.019
** 0.009 0.045
** 0.018 
Other family members in home country          0.020
** 0.010 0.062
*** 0.021 
Children  in  France       -0.031
** 0.015  -0.023  0.027 
Children in home country          0.076
*** 0.016 0.051
** 0.024 
Tests of linear hypothesis     
Return estimates = Va-et-vient estimates 
 Value;  d.f.;  prob. 
 
61.80; 13; 0.000 
 
92.27; 20; 0.000 
Family location estimates = 0 
 Value;  d.f.;  prob. 
  
168.9; 14; 0.000 
Family location: Return = Va-et-vient 
 Value;  d.f.;  prob. 
  
32.4; 7; 0.000 
Test of H0: IIA holds (return omitted) 
  Value; d.f. ; prob  
 
-8.99; 14; 1.000 
 
-1.535; 21; 1.000 
Pseudo R²  0.058  0.085 
Log likelihood  -3063.4  -2974.0 
Source: Survey PRI 2003 
Note: Multinomial Logit models. Marginal effects and their standard errors after estimation are 
computed at the means of the independent variables. Levels of significance are respectively equal to 
1% (
***), 5% (
**) and 10% (
*). For each specification, the reference alternative is to stay in France 
and the sample comprises 3915 observations. 26 
Table 6 
MNL models of the impact of children’s location 
Return Va-et-vient  Specification 
Marg.  e. s.e. Marg.  e. s.e. 
(1)  All observation (N=3915)      
Control variables:   Individual + Country dummies         
Family variables: Number of children under 16  -0.0020  0.0033  -0.0139
** 0.0069 
(2)  All observation (N=3915)      
Control variables:  Individual + Country dummies         
Family variables: Number of children under 16  -0.0040  0.0055  -0.0399
*** 0.0110 
    Number of girls under 16  0.0053  0.0084  0.0525
*** 0.0165 
(3)  All observation (N=3915)      
Control variables:  Individual + Country dummies         
Family variables: Number of children  0.0002  0.0031  -0.0085  0.0060 
  Number  of  girls  -0.0002  0.0044  0.0182
** 0.0081 
(4)  All  observations  (N=3915)      
Control variables: Individual + Country dummies         
Family variables: Number of children living in France  -0.0074
*** 0.0033 -0.0093 0.0063 
    Number of girls living in France  0.0044  0.0047  0.0154
* 0.0086 
    Number of children living in origin country  0.0274
*** 0.0058  0.0039  0.0167 
    Number of girls living in origin country  -0.0154  0.0105  0.0409  0.0279 
Source: Survey PRI 2003 
Note: Multinomial Logit models. Marginal effects and their standard errors after estimation 
are computed at the means of the independent variables. Levels of significance are 
respectively equal to 1% (
***), 5% (
**) and 10% (
*). For each specification, the reference 
alternative is to stay in France and the sample comprises 3915 observations. Other covariates 
are similar to those of Table 5, without family location variables. 
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Table 7 
The impact of the child’s location on the parent’s location decision 
 Model  1  : 
Exogenous child’s location 
Model 2 : 
Endogenous child’s location  
Variables  Return Va-et-vient Return Va-et-vient 
  coef. s.e. coef. s.e. coef. s.e. coef. s.e. 
EQUATION 1 – LOGIT MNL          
Constant  0.202 0.532 0.532
* 0.310 0.383 0.567 0.690
* 0.357 


















Live in couple  -0.114 0.119 0.058 0.075 -0.128 0.127 0.046 0.086 






Household’s income (10e-5)  0.083 0.187  0.401
***  0.104 0.136 0.201  0.463
*** 0.116 
Origin country (reference = Northern 
Europe) 
        





East Europe  -0.107 0.415  0.646
*** 0.211  -0.040  0.430 0.721
*** 0.237 

























Child’ location          
Child in origin country  1.365
*** 0.109 0.531
*** 0.081 0.870
***  0.178 0.026 0.161 
EQUATION 2 – PROBIT       coef  s.e. 
Constant       - 3 . 4 9 0
*** 0.087 
Child’s characteristics          
Female       0 . 1 0 8
** 0.053 
Age (10
e-2)       0 . 0 3 0
*** 0.003 
Born in origin country       1 . 6 9 7
*** 0.058 
Correlation between residuals   0.542
*** (0.113) 
Log likelihood  -9039.4 -11720.5 
Source: Survey PRI 2003 
Note: The first model is a standard MNL model with Huber-White corrected standard errors. The 
second model is a simultaneous recursive model with one MNL Logit equation (for the parent’s 
preferred choice of location) and one Probit equation (for the child’s location). Huber-White 
corrected standard errors are reported. Levels of significance are respectively equal to 1% (
***), 5% 
(
**) and 10% (
*). For each specification, the reference alternative is to stay in France for the MNL 
model. The sample comprises 11349 child-parent pairs belonging to 3569 families. 28 
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